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Abstract
Saudi Arabia is diversifying its economy by becoming a global technological hub. Driven by
its ‘Vision 2030’ initiative, it has embarked on the most ambitious and far-reaching transfor-
mation plan in the Kingdom’s history. At the core of this transformation are the investment
and development of artificial intelligence (AI) and its integration into a new mega-city,
Neom. Currently under construction, Neom is seeking to integrate robotics and AI seam-
lessly into every aspect of citizens’ lives in a bid to generate revenues from key economic
sectors for the future. This transition from an economy based on hydrocarbons to AI is, how-
ever, more than economic. It is a bid to secure the survival of the House of Saud and meet
the growing challenges of constructing a state around oil. Nevertheless, what happens in
Neom may provide insights into how AI will impact the world beyond a cross-roads built
on sand.
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Introduction
IT IS COMMONPLACE to hear suggestions of an
artificial intelligence (AI) ‘arms race’ taking
shape between the United States and China.
However, this great power rivalry often
drowns discussion about AI developments
elsewhere. This is unfortunate because this
new technology is already marching across
the globe and having significant geopolitical
implications. Notably, it is in the Gulf region
where the embrace of AI technology and
development appears to be both strongest,
and most surprising, given the region’s lim-
ited population size. Saudi Arabia, the Uni-
ted Arab Emirates and Qatar are already
embracing AI strategies that are arguably
more advanced than many other countries
around the world. In Saudi Arabia, this
embrace is not peripheral, but rather a fun-
damental pillar of its economic development
strategy. When the Kingdom announced its
‘Vision 2030’ programme, seeking to diver-
sify the economy away from reliance on
hydrocarbon energy, it declared that ‘AI is at
the heart of this endeavour. It permeates all
aspects of Vision 2030.’1 This plan is nothing
short of an attempt to remake the Saudi
economy. However, as the state attempts the
largest and most ambitious transformation
plan since the advent of oil, its reliance on
AI will inevitably grow.
Signalling the importance of AI to Saudi
Arabia’s economic development, the Global
Artificial Intelligence Summit 2020 will be
held in Riyadh. At the behest of Crown
Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the summit
promises to bring together expertise in AI
and be a significant international forum ded-
icated to the advancement of AI technology.
Saudi Arabia is attempting to become a glo-
bal leader in the technology and a central
hub for global AI expertise networks. The
Kingdom is seeking to pull together emerg-
ing trends and capitalise on this technology’s
promise of creating a ‘civilizational leap for
humanity’.2 Saudi Arabia is attempting to
recast its identity as a technological leader in
advanced manufacturing, technological
research and design, and as the hub of a
new technological silk road linking three
continents. We show how this approach
reveals a long-term structural need for Saudi
Arabia to move away from economic reli-
ance on oil and gas and is a pathway to
regime survival. We also discuss the broader
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implications of AI playing such an important
role in the country’s future.
Why diversify the Saudi
economy?
Saudi Arabia announced its plans to reduce
its dependency on oil and gas and diversify
its economy in April 2016, with the publica-
tion of the Kingdom’s Vision 2030 pro-
gramme. Currently, the oil and gas sector
amount to approximately 50 per cent of
gross domestic product, and 70 per cent of
export earnings.3 However, Saudi Arabia’s
reliance on fossil fuels carries significant
risks, prompting the need for transformation.
Firstly, in the longer term, the global transi-
tion from hydrocarbon fuels to renewable
and low-carbon energy represents an histori-
cal shift. Although the speed of this transi-
tion is presently insufficient, the need to
circumvent the worst effects of global cli-
mate change adds greater pressure to
develop and deploy new technologies while
reducing hydrocarbon consumption. Failure
to diversify its economy would leave Saudi
Arabia vulnerable to significant changes in
global energy markets.
Secondly, in the medium term, Saudi
Arabia has a problem with its domestic
energy consumption. Since 1965, the coun-
try’s domestic consumption of energy
has increased on average by 5 per cent per
year. So, although internal consumption has
slowed since 2015, linear projections con-
tinue to show a growing domestic demand
within the foreseeable future (see Figure 1).
Indeed, Glada Lahn and Paul Stevens’ influ-
ential Chatham House report identified as
early as 2011 that there is a ‘hidden energy
crisis’ whereby the Saudis consume a quarter
of all the oil they produce. Best projections
show that Saudi Arabia could become a net
oil importer by 2038, making the Kingdom’s
pattern of oil consumption unsustainable,
and a transformation necessary.4
Thirdly, even in the short term, Saudi Ara-
bia’s energy infrastructure has shown itself
to be vulnerable to attack. Following the
September 2019 drone strike on the Abqaiq
plant, nearly half of the country’s daily oil
production was taken offline, amounting to
nearly 6 per cent of global production.
Although production levels were restored
within a month, during that time, Saudi Ara-
bia needed to import oil from surrounding
countries to meet its export obligations. This
exposed severe volatility, not least in oil
prices that rose by as much as 20 per cent,
and the global economy’s vulnerability to
crisis emanating from the broader insecuri-
ties of the Gulf region. Vision 2030 is
designed to reduce these short- to long-term
risks, and in order to implement it, Saudi
Arabia is growingly reliant on advances in
AI technology.
What is artificial intelligence?
Before outlining how Gulf states have begun
adopting AI, it is important to recognise that
AI is not new. The term ‘artificial intelli-
gence’ can be traced back as far as 1956, and
we can recognise work in the field of AI
development from in the 1940s with the
introduction of the ‘Turing Test’. Devised by
Alan Turing, the test sought to provide a
working definition of intelligence, arguing
that the ability to demonstrate machine intel-
ligence would be demonstrated when a com-
puter could passably simulate a human
being. The thrust of AI development has
sought to pass this test ever since. Effec-
tively, AI is an attempt to build intelligent
entities that can match or surpass human
intelligence and rationality.
AI development has become a universal
field, pulling interdisciplinary strands to-
gether to build machines that can function
independently in complex and changing
environments.5 Over seventy years, AI devel-
opment has aimed at creating computer
capabilities in four broad areas: natural lan-
guage processing (NLP), knowledge repre-
sentation (KR), automated reasoning (AR),
and machine learning (ML). These capabili-
ties have in isolated areas allowed computers
to communicate in human languages, store
the knowledge gathered from their senses,
answer questions, draw new conclusions,
and detect and extrapolate patterns in any
new circumstances they find themselves. In
concrete terms, these capabilities lie at the
heart of modern technologies such as smart-
phone voice recognition, autopilot in planes,
driverless cars, translation software, new
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marketing techniques, investment fund
managing, advances in security and surveil-
lance software, facial recognition and autono-
mous drones, amongst other wide-ranging
uses. The areas where AI is being applied are
already vast and expanding as further
advances are made, but we are already at the
point where AI can ‘see’, ‘hear’, ‘talk’, ‘smell’,
‘touch’, ‘move’, write books, read books, play
games and understand emotions.
The development of AI capabilities has his-
torically ebbed and flowed. Successful strides
forward have been followed by so-called ‘AI
winters’. However, what makes contemporary
developments in AI stand out are three crucial
developments. First is the way the technology
began to be applied to the internet through the
1990s. This started to pull capabilities together
and create a complete agent architecture with
algorithms underlying internet search engines
and website aggregators. Second, in addition
to pulling capabilities together, researchers
also turned to the internet as a source of big,
free and instantly available data.6 They
stopped focussing on the integrity of computer
algorithms and started to concentrate on enor-
mous datasets while ‘being less picky about
which algorithm to apply’.7 With the size of
data driving advancements in AI (because the
more examples of something AI has, the faster
and more accurately the technology can learn),
this was a step-change in the development of
this technology. It was akin to shifting steam-
ships from coal to oil, allowing AI to move fas-
ter, further and into more domains than ever
before. Third, AI has come to utilise the inter-
net of things (IoT) combined with machine
learning to feed its ever-growing need to
gather data. Combined, these three advance-
ments have laid the foundations of modern
developments in AI, taking the technology
from research labs and giving it practical use
in our everyday lives. Accordingly, while there
is considerable hyperbole about what AI can
currently do, its growing ubiquity and poten-
tial have garnered the backing of the Saudi
state and its sovereign wealth fund, also
known as the Public Investment Fund (PIF).
How will AI be used to diversify
the Saudi Arabian economy?
By 2025, global revenues from AI are
expected to rise to $90 billion, growing on
average by 45 per cent each year.8 Beyond
-
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Figure 1: Internal Saudi energy consumption from 1965 to 2018
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2019 data. The figures are calculated by combining the total
consumption of oil, natural gas and coal.
S A U D I A R A B I A ’ S E C O NOM I C D I V E R S I F I C A T I O N F R OM O I L A N D GA S 3
© 2020 The Author. The Political Quarterly published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of
Political Quarterly Publishing Co (PQPC)
The Political Quarterly
this, longer term estimates project AI con-
tributing to a 14 per cent growth of global
GDP by 2030, ‘the equivalent of an
additional $15.7 trillion’.9 Accordingly, AI
represents a very significant commercial
opportunity, and by pulling together trends
and networks in this technology, Vision 2030
seeks to diversify the Saudi economy. To sig-
nal Saudi Arabia’s commitment in this area,
several grand gestures have already been
made. For example, Saudi Arabia has
become the first country in the world to
grant citizenship to an AI-driven humanoid
robot called Sophia. More substantially, the
Kingdom is also in the process of building a
new megacity called Neom, a mix of Arabic
and Greek meaning ‘new future’. Positioned
in the north-western Tabuk province, this
new ‘independent international zone’ will
span territory from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and
Jordan, covering an area of approximately
26,500 km2. That is seventeen times the size
of London, and only marginally smaller than
Belgium. While Saudi Arabia is not relin-
quishing sovereign law within this space, it
promises to be independent of the King-
dom’s existing governmental framework.
To build Neom, the PIF has publicly com-
mitted $500 billion. However, Saudi Arabia
aims to combine its sovereign wealth with
that of local and international investors. In
return, the Kingdom has forecast Neom con-
tributing an annual GDP return of $100 bil-
lion by 2030. Moving away from oil and gas
revenues, Neom will focus on developments
in sixteen areas that have been identified as
‘key economic sectors for the future’:10
• Energy
• Water
• Mobility
• Biotech
• Food
• Manufacturing
• Media
• Entertainment, culture and fashion
• Technology and digital
• Tourism
• Sport
• Design and construction
• Services
• Health and well-being
• Education
• Livability
The objective of innovating in each of
these sixteen areas, from renewable energy
through to making citizens’ lives more effi-
cient, is to ‘curb economic leakage in the
Kingdom and the region in general’ and it is
already envisioned that AI and robotics will
be a driving force behind innovations in
each of these areas. As Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman explained, in Neom,
‘everything will have a link with artificial
intelligence, with the internet of things—ev-
erything’.11 As such, AI will be ubiquitously
integrated into everyday life throughout the
city. AI’s integration will be designed to help
facilitate the Kingdom’s transition into an
innovative technology hub, providing long-
term economic stability.
Phase one of building Neom is currently
underway and is due for completion during
2020. Neom airport is near completion and
is registered as an official international
airport; the residential area in Neom Bay is
also under construction and will soon have
the capacity to house 30,000 people. Never-
theless, beyond the plans to build physical
infrastructure where there was once only
desert, the Saudi government is undertaking
more comprehensive institutional reforms to
prepare for AI and this period of economic
transition. By royal decree in the summer of
2019, The Saudi Data and Artificial Intelli-
gence Authority, and the National Centre
for Artificial Intelligence were established.
These new institutions will link to a
National Data Management Office, which
looks to be a rebranding of the National
Information Centre, currently run from
within the Interior Ministry. Combined,
these institutions are designed to underpin
the governance structures and organisation
of digitisation and AI within the Kingdom.
These institutional reforms are not alone:
officials are set to introduce educational
reforms that would deliver digital skills into
primary and secondary schools. In a highly
conservative and traditional country, such
reforms are intended to modernise Saudi
society and slowly shift the country away
from a rentier state towards ‘innovation-dri-
ven economic growth’. As such, we can
already see plans for a generational trans-
formation taking shape as we approach
2030.
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Political implications
Although Saudi elites have presented the
overriding rationale for creating Neom and
transitioning to an AI-driven future as
benign and economically driven, we should
not ignore the political implications of the
transformation currently underway. Changes
in the global economy and Saudi society are
beginning to challenge the rentier state
model, whereby petrodollars cannot be
relied upon as a resource supporting the
Saudi royal family. For example, as the
Arab Spring spread in 2011, the Saudi
regime demonstrated its reliance on co-opt-
ing sections of civil society using large sums
of its oil wealth. King Abdullah declared
nearly $100 billion of new public spending
in addition to a $36 billion package of new
jobless benefits, education and housing sub-
sidies and debt write-offs targeted at youth,
civil servants and the unemployed.12 Taking
Saudi patrimonialism to new heights, this
increased overall public spending in 2011
by a quarter, reaching 25 to 28 per cent of
Saudi GDP. Neom and economic diversifica-
tion driven by AI is therefore not merely
economic. By generating a new source of
revenue, it is tied to the long-term stability
and viability of the House of Saud. Acutely
aware of their history, Saudi elites are seek-
ing to prevent the collapse of the third
Saudi state that is held together through
religious and tribal associations and bar-
gaining. The economic benefits of AI, it is
planned, will allow the Saudi regime to
change the way it has previously garnered
wealth and power and contribute to the
regime’s survival.
Driven by AI, Saudi Arabia’s technological
modernisation will facilitate a pathway to
the so-called ‘China model’ or ‘Beijing con-
sensus’. This combines autocratic rule with
an embrace of free-market capitalism, and
increasingly, a focus on digital surveillance
of the domestic population. AI is needed for
this, as it would allow the Saudi state to
leapfrog industrialisation and shortfalls in
state and institutional capacity. Neom is fun-
damental to realising this vision as it seeks
to move Saudi Arabia into advanced manu-
facturing without industrialisation. However,
AI is increasingly being seen as a ‘dual-use’,
technology with serious ethical implications.
It has the potential to enhance military, eco-
nomic and information supremacy. Just as
AI can be programmed to watch for ineffi-
cient uses of water in a farmer’s field or
overuse of energy in a building, it is also
capable of monitoring political opponents
online, recognising faces at political rallies,
and profiling a population’s political persua-
sions. These have only recently started to
spark debates about the ethics and uses of
AI within mature democracies. Less space
for debate exists in autocratic regimes such
as those in the Gulf, and it is already clear
that this technology is developing faster than
public debate.
Conclusion
The importance and implications of AI tech-
nology are profound. As the Google CEO,
Sundar Pichai, has described ‘AI is one of the
most important things humanity is working
on. It is more profound than . . . electricity or
fire’.13 For countries such as Saudi Arabia, AI
is being seen as the future engine of state
transformation. A future that cannot be deliv-
ered by relying on hydrocarbon fuels. How-
ever, AI technology opens up a pathway for
authoritarian persistence and regime survival
beyond a reliance on energy resources. As
Saudi Arabia builds Neom and seeks to
become the centre of a global technology hub,
it will also be attempting to ensure regime
survival. It will attempt to cement a techno-
logically enhanced neo-authoritarian model of
governance that was not previously possible.
As such, we can see Neom as an experiment
for the Saudi state. However, it will also pro-
vide an early indication of how AI is likely to
be further integrated into our lives. Accord-
ingly, what happens in the Saudi desert over
the next decade is likely to have an impact
beyond economics and technology, and may
well show us the ‘new future’ that AI devel-
opment will bring.
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